

# Progress in Human Geography

<http://phg.sagepub.com/>

---

## **The geographies and politics of globalization**

Philip F. Kelly

*Prog Hum Geogr* 1999 23: 379

DOI: 10.1177/030913259902300303

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://phg.sagepub.com/content/23/3/379>

---

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

**Additional services and information for *Progress in Human Geography* can be found at:**

**Email Alerts:** <http://phg.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

**Subscriptions:** <http://phg.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

**Reprints:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

**Permissions:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

**Citations:** <http://phg.sagepub.com/content/23/3/379.refs.html>

# The geographies and politics of globalization

Philip F. Kelly

Southeast Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260

**Abstract:** Recent debates on globalization have tended to be polarized between those wishing to ‘unthink’ the broad set of economic, political and cultural processes it encompasses and those who enthusiastically embrace them. This article maps out the recent geographical literature on the politics of globalization as an idea, and suggests some of the directions in which less polarized and more sophisticated interpretations of globalization are heading. The focus of the article is on globalization as a political discourse, which is addressed through ideas on the production of scale. The problematic association of globalization with neoliberalism is also explored. Five ‘counterdiscourses’ of globalization are then identified which attempt to rethink the political orthodoxy of neoliberal globalization. The article concludes by arguing for a ‘relational’ view of scale and suggesting some of the promises, and pitfalls, of rethinking the global scale.

**Key words:** discourse, globalization, neoliberalism, politics, resistance, scale.

## 1 Introduction

It would seem that at the end of the millennium, the word globalization has become the new mantra for our times (together, of course, with ‘millennium’ itself). While the word’s early usage (e.g., Levitt, 1983; and see Waters, 1995) referred to particular sectors and processes, it has more recently been picked up in a flurry of excitement by scholars, politicians and business gurus to capture a sense of rapid time-space compression, connectivity, communication and circulation in diverse processes of cultural, economic, political and social change. This current preoccupation with globalization perhaps reflects three different processes at work in constructing understandings of our social world. First, it seems fair to suggest that there are indeed some qualitative changes occurring in the nature, extent and intensity of social interaction on a worldwide scale. These material changes are associated with new technologies, institutions and imperatives to move information, capital, commodities and people around the world (see Castells, 1996; Dicken, 1998). Some would even choose to identify a watershed of

sorts somewhere in the mid-1970s when a global form of economic and social life started to become apparent (Cox, 1996).

A second context for globalization 'fever' is in the new conceptual lenses through which we now view the world – what we are seeing might be changing, but our ways of seeing it are also being reworked. To some, the various dimensions of social life commonly gathered under the rubric of globalization might look like rather careless eclecticism. But the grouping together of economic, cultural, political and other spheres must surely also reflect the erosion of disciplinary boundaries in the social sciences and humanities, so that there is a growing sense of the interconnection of different spheres. Geographers in particular have been at the forefront of this process of disciplinary transgression, as researchers recognize that economics has culture (reviewed by Barnes, 1995; Thrift and Olds, 1996); that politics is also economics (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Peck, 1996); that culture is politics (Gregory, 1994; Smith, 1997); and so on. Thus the way we see the world now tends to be more integrative and interdisciplinary. Add to this the new technologies of knowledge – the Internet, email, sophisticated statistical data collection, international publishing, the spread of English as a global *lingua franca*, etc. – and globalization seems all the more easy to imagine, particularly for those of us with access to these technologies.

The third context in which to understand the popularity of globalization as a concept is to be found in its *own* global circulation as an *idea* – a way of constructing a particular geography of the world. Globalization has, in other words, acquired a global currency, circulating through complex networks formed by multilateral institutions, broadcast, print and electronic media, academic exchange and the self-reflexive analysis of what Thrift calls 'soft' or 'virtual' capitalism' (1998; 1999). A key factor behind the rise of the idea of globalization is its frequent linkage to particular (neoliberal) social and economic policies. By constructing a particular vision of global space and the 'place' of individuals, national economies and so on within it, it has been argued that the idea of globalization forms part of a rhetoric to legitimize certain political strategies. Thus, notwithstanding the processes of intensifying and extending social relations mentioned above, globalization can also be seen as a myth, a construction, a discourse (Dicken *et al.*, 1997; Kelly, 1997; Leyshon, 1997).

It is the latter context of the globalization debate that this article attempts to map out in more detail. I will suggest, in the first part of the article, that a useful starting point in exploring the political dimensions of globalization is the idea that space and scale are socially produced rather than absolute entities. Doing so provides a powerful conceptual framework through which to explore the power relationships that constitute the construction of globalization as a discourse, but without losing sight of the ways in which this discourse is rooted in the qualitative changes taking place in various social processes of interaction at the global scale. I will suggest that an orthodoxy has emerged around the construction of globalization and the policies that it is seen to imply, but the easy conflation of neoliberalism and globalization should be treated cautiously. Having acknowledged the constructedness of globalization in this way, we are then in a position to explore some of the critical, or counterdiscursive, arguments that have been circulated to temper the mythology surrounding globalization and to reconstruct it either in a less universalizing or more socially progressive manner. These counterdiscourses are grouped under five headings: the empirical validity of globalization; the reassertion of the state; embedding global processes in 'place'; globalizing civil society;

and global governance. By carefully considering the arguments made in each case, some paths forward are identified which attempt to overcome the polarization of debate between what Dicken *et al.* (1997) call the 'booster' and 'hypercritical' lines on globalization.

## II Producing scales

Conventional representations of space assume its objectivity and neutrality. Space is viewed as a container for social processes, and scale is simply a hierarchical division of physical space in which particular processes are consigned to specific levels. Building on the work of Henri Lefebvre, recent geographical scholarship has attempted to demonstrate that this conception of space fails to acknowledge that scales are actually representations of space that are socially produced and politically charged (Smith and Katz, 1993; Jonas, 1994; Beauregard, 1995; Smith, 1992; 1993; 1996; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Kelly, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997a; 1997b). In other words, the analytical containment of social processes at particular scales is a socially constituted, not naturally determined, decision. Swyngedouw (1996), for example, shows how the Belgian state has redefined its scale of operation from a Fordist national scale of capital–state–labour relations, to a 'global' entrepreneurial state in which class divisions and coalitions are redefined to the detriment of weaker groups. In another example, Herod (1997a; 1997b) shows how labour in the longshore industry of the USA east coast sought to reconstruct the scale at which contractual negotiations were conducted from individual ports to the national scale. In both examples, then, the reconstruction of scale suggests the contingency and socially constituted nature of scale. Thus, as Jones (1997) points out, scale is an epistemological form rather than an ontological one – it is about how we understand the social world, rather than about some fundamental essence of that reality.

What these examples further suggest, however, is that it would be wrong to assume that scales are *purely* constructed or representational. As Cox (1997b) notes, scales are reproduced in material power relations (a connection made explicit by Lefebvre). For a representation to have any purchase it must have some reference to material social relations, and with the globalization of social processes these relations have been in flux. As the globe becomes more materially interconnected, dynamics at one scale are increasingly implicated at other scales. To speak of local, regional, national or even global processes is meaningless – social relations are in fact played out across scales rather than confined within them. Consequently it makes little sense to privilege any scale as a primary referent for analysing particular social processes. Thus, for example, Kevin Cox (1997a) shows through a series of examples how 'local' politics become enlarged through 'networks of association' such that centres of social power are effectively mobilized to bring about political outcomes at a local scale or, conversely, local issues are utilized by actors to achieve goals on a broader scale. In either case, what becomes apparent is that scale does not provide a simple container for action, but rather a site for interaction between social forces operating across scales and a contested political construction of social processes.

For some writers, the fundamental power relations shaping scale politics are to be found in the logic of capitalism, as it seeks transient resolutions to its contradictory

tendencies. This forms the basis for Swyngedouw's exploration of scale which, he argues, is 'not socially or politically neutral, but embodies and expresses power relationships' (1997a: 139–40). The production and configuration of scale (and space) are central to the regulation of capitalism's contradictions and so scales represent a 'socio-spatial compromise' to contain and channel conflict. Swyngedouw's focus is on the post-Fordist mode of regulation and so he is concerned to show the way in which the Fordist nation-state scale of social life has been superseded by a process of 'glocalization' in which the scale of regulation has moved upwards to the supranational scale and downwards to the city, neighbourhood, etc. (see also Cox, 1992; Jessop, 1999). What concerns Swyngedouw and others is that a broadly, or at least potentially, democratized national political space is giving way to an undemocratic, autocratic and authoritarian system of quasi-state regulatory processes at multiple scales.

The production of space and scale need not necessarily follow directly from a capitalist logic (see, for example, Hanson and Pratt's 1995 study of gendered urban spaces), but work from a broadly Marxian tradition does provide the most extensively developed account of the production of scale and its close connection with social power relations. Establishing in this way that scale can be viewed as both constructed and political enables us to think about globalization in a different light. First of all it suggests that as globalization discourses take the global scale as the key locus of analysis, we should bear in mind that this scale, like any other, is a socially constructed way of understanding our social world and its spaces. Secondly, any such construction of scale is tied closely to changes in material power relations and so the politics of globalization must be carefully considered. In the next two sections we will explore the political construction of the global scale in more depth.

### III Orthodox versions of the global

The most crass of the orthodox representations of globalization have been effectively demolished in recent literature. Books such as Ohmae's *The borderless world* (1990) and *The end of the nation state* (1995), Naisbitt's *Global paradox* (1994), and O'Brien's *Global financial integration: the end of geography* (1992) have received perhaps undue attention and, in academic geography at least, have been effectively dispatched (see Martin, 1994; Clark and O'Connor, 1997; Yeung, 1998b). Elsewhere, however, this literature forms the basis for popular understandings of globalization. The caricature presented by such books is of a world moving rapidly towards a globalized end-state. It is a world of intimately interconnected economic and cultural relations, unprecedented in the intensity and extent of the ties they create across space. In this representation, spatial variation simply provides a mosaic of diverse but converging containers for disembodied flows of capital, images, etc. Capital is disembedded from its national origins and negligent of the context in which its circulation becomes fixed; culture is no longer meaningfully associated with place; and the existence of a globalized market is taken to mean that the market dictates global relationships. Place and community become relevant only in a relative sense and cultures integrate and converge through flows of images and information. In moderate versions, the state becomes marginalized – Gary Gereffi (1996a: 64), for example, argues that 'economic globalization has reduced the theoretical centrality of the nation-state'; in

more extreme versions, the state is an anachronistic irrelevancy (Ohmae, 1995).

This image of globalization represents an interconnected set of economic and cultural processes operating at the global scale with an inevitable, inexorable and ultimately benign logic. It is a representation that has been widely criticized and often dismissed as 'globethink', 'globaloney' or 'globabble'. Spich (1995: 10–11), for example argues that globalization '... is a mindset, an idea set, an ideal visualization, a popular metaphor and, finally, a stylized way of thinking about complex international developments'. There is a danger here, however, that the language of globalization becomes viewed simply at the level of discourse. As Walck and Bilimoria (1995: 3) suggest: 'there is a lingering suspicion . . . that globalization is not an output of the "real" forces of markets and technologies, but is rather an input in the form of rhetorical and discursive constructs, practices and ideologies which some groups are imposing on others for political and economic gain.' Steingard and Fitzgibbons (1995), for example, castigate globalization as an ideological construct devised to satisfy capitalism's need for new markets and labour sources and propelled by the uncritical 'sycophancy' of the international academic business community. They argue (1995: 35) that '... popular writers like Naisbitt have been manufactured into positive cheerleaders by the very apparatus they extol. Those who foresee a happy, multicoloured, and economically equitable global culture are peddling ideology, not reality'. But having discounted globalization as an ideological construction, such authors then proceed to detail some of its very material consequences: the sterilization of variegated cultures; the 'race to the bottom' for cheap labour and regulatory laxity; apocalyptic environmental impact; and so on. In so doing they reify what they claim (1995: 39) was merely a construction: 'we submit that free-market expansion is not a fact, but an interpreted, constructed, politically supported ideology and set of values which is only one of many alternative economic forms of organization.' Some, it would seem, want to deny the reality of globalization while at the same time lambaste its effects.

It is important to recognize that popular business writers are not just constructing an imaginary edifice called globalization. The processes they identify, and in some cases exaggerate, are real enough – capital flows, cultural hybridity, industrial investment, migration, etc., are all materially experienced. More importantly, however, writers such as Ohmae and Naisbitt reflect and inform a prevalent set of themes in popular economic and political thinking. In numerous national contexts it is easy enough to find rhetoric that represents the global as the only scale at which contemporary economic and political issues can truly be understood. Gertler (1997b: 18) notes that in Canada the federal Liberal government's representation of globalization can be summed up as 'wake up to reality'. As Prime Minister Jean Chretien has pronounced: 'international finance knows no borders . . . we cannot stop globalization, we need to adjust to it . . . Globalization is imposing a healthy discipline that will result in healthier economies in the long run' (*Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1996). Before assuming power, British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that 'the determining context of economic policy is the new global market. That imposes huge limitations of a practical nature – quite apart from reasons of principle – on macroeconomic policies' (quoted in Saul, 1995: 19). Significantly, both leaders are considered to be on the centre-left of the political spectrum. Meanwhile in the Philippines, President Fidel Ramos argues that '... there is a new reality that underscores our national life. We are part of a new global economy – in which every nation must compete, if it is to prosper . . . [We must] imbibe and

expand the culture of globalization . . . [or] be left behind in the march toward progress and prosperity for all' (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 1996; Ramos, 1996).

These are not random quotes plucked strategically out of context. They are rooted in a deep-seated and widespread consensus concerning the nature of the contemporary world economy and the subservient role of government in relation to the supranational scale. In political terms, then, globalization discourse is widely deployed to imply the inevitability of certain events and the necessity of particular policy options in the name of global competitiveness. The plausible is made to seem natural; the unpleasant seems necessary. Globalization is the *deus ex machina* of national politics, to which unpleasant decisions can be deferred – or against which national struggle must be directed. Hence in the recent economic turmoil in east Asia, the global economy has been portrayed as a tidal wave that must be harnessed and ridden (Singapore), a disembodied force that must be resisted (Indonesia), or a set of powerful agents who can be held accountable for economic decline (Malaysia) – the metaphors are multiple, and mixed. Interestingly, a further consequence of the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 has been a growing differentiation of political-economic space in the region. 'Emerging markets' and 'Asian growth economies' are increasingly being disaggregated according to 'market confidence' in national economic management and political stability. Thus a crisis induced by the globalization of short-term capital flows has led to the reterritorialization of regional space. This reassertion of place-based distinctions will be discussed later.

While representations of globalization might be used for national political purposes, as the earlier discussion of the production of scale made clear, these representations are more than just rhetoric. First, as noted earlier, they are rooted in material power relations of contemporary capitalism and geopolitics. Secondly, as Dicken *et al.* (1997) point out, there are real political repercussions tied up in the globalization debate as the caricature of a global end-state is deployed prescriptively (see also Smith, 1997). Piven too highlights the material causes and consequences of a globalization discourse. She argues that capital's mobility – 'the threat to exit' – is at the base of globalization, which is essentially a political discourse to empower capital against labour: globalization 'has become a political force, helping to create the institutional realities it purportedly merely describes' (Piven, 1995: 108). Thus ideological and material processes form two sides of the same coin. Globalization, as '... a hegemonic ideology supporting the necessity and inevitability of the free movement of capital and goods, helped to create the institutional conditions which then contributed to making the free movement of capital and goods a reality' (Hirst, 1997: 424).

#### IV Globalization and neoliberalism

Many commentators have equated the political deployment of globalization discourse with the pursuit of neoliberal economic policies. Leo Panitch (1996: 96) talks of attempts to 'constitutionalise neoliberalism' through 'interstate treaties designed to legally enforce upon future governments general adherence to the discipline of the capital market'. He suggests that neoliberalism, or at least the competitiveness discourse attached to it, is inextricably linked to globalization. In terms of more practical politics, Kevin Cox (1992: 427) argues that images of globalization

... are likely to encourage defeatism among all those rooted in local communities, including large fractions of labor ... [S]uch ideas lend support to revisionist blandishments – whether those of national political parties seeking reasons to roll back the welfare state or more local booster lobbies opposed to shifts in local public spending, to impact fees, linkage, etc.

Others see globalization as linked more broadly to the processes of uneven capitalist development – processes which transcend the current vogue of neoliberalism designed to serve their interests. David Harvey (1996a) sees globalization in this way as a spatial fix for capitalism and an ideological tool with which to attack socialists. Similarly, Neil Smith (1997) considers globalization as the ideological successor to, and reinvention of, the discredited modernization theory of development that held sway from the 1950s to the 1970s. The logics of capitalism remain, but the ‘third world’ of modernization theory has been erased. Just as before under modernization, ‘developing’ countries were ‘seeded’ for global capital, so globalization too expresses ‘a central tendency in the uneven development of capitalist economies’ (Smith, 1997: 178).

While Smith’s and Harvey’s points regarding the globalization and the logics of capitalism are sound on their own terms, there are reasons to tread cautiously when equating globalization with neoliberalism. First, while globalization represents a rather diffuse concept, neoliberal economic policy is fairly well defined. The former might be used to legitimize the latter, but the two are not identical. As Pieterse (1997) and Amin (1997) point out, globalization might be politically disabling in certain contexts, but it is important not to conflate it with distinct issues of social process and policy. Thus the problem is a political, not an analytical, one: ‘The key problem is this: if the target is neoliberalism and the unfettered market economy, then why attack globalization? The case against globalization quickly becomes slippery and even contradictory’ (Pieterse, 1997: 372). Neoliberal macroeconomic policy does not necessarily follow from the internationalization or globalization of an economy (Notermans, 1997). As Weiss (1997) points out, conflating neoliberalism with globalization ignores the fact that monetarist policies were, in many countries, a response not to international conditions but to inflation and perceived policy errors of the 1970s. The fact that many governments do not follow neoliberal policies suggests that the state is not powerless to imagine alternatives in an era of ‘globalization’.

Secondly, and perhaps a more important reason to be wary of directly equating globalization with neoliberalism, is that the progressive political potential of the global scale can easily be neglected. As Adam Tickell (1998: 2) observes, ‘to conclude that because globalization rhetorics serve a particular political-economic interest, that the best possible political strategy is to undermine the globalization thesis runs the risk of neutering antiliberal possibilities’. In some senses, progressive causes *need* globalization. James Mittelman (1996b), for example, argues that while globalization has become encoded with the values of economic liberalism, there is a clash between two emerging models, neoliberal globalization and democratic globalization. The latter forms ‘a far less coherent counterforce’ seen, for example, in the emergence of global civil society movements (1996b: 241). Similarly for Smith (1997: 189) labour will ‘be at its strongest when international organization can match the fluidity and global reach of capital’ (see also Cox, 1997c; Herod, 1998). Globalization, then, need not simply mean the globalization of a particular model of economic and social policy. If instead it is taken to be simply a process of extensification and intensification of social connectedness across space, rather than a normative and inevitable end-state, then it can be interpreted as



either progressive or regressive (or somewhere in between), depending upon how such processes are harnessed and used. As Lefebvre pointed out, ultimately all possibilities for emancipation lie at the planetary scale, 'the space of the human species' (1991: 422; cited by Brenner, 1997: 153).

Just as progressive movements can use globalization, so critical social theory needs the global scale as one level (amongst many) at which to locate analysis and understand social processes. Numerous theorists identify the logics of globalization in a variety of processes. Manuel Castells (1996), for example, writes of a network society in which a global space of flows is created through communications technologies, while David Harvey analyses the logics of capitalism which drive it towards the need for a spatial fix at a global scale – indeed many would argue that it is only on the global scale that contemporary capitalism can be adequately understood (Brenner, 1997: 143). Equally in geopolitics, environmentalism, feminism and other axes of social thought, the global has been an important scale for critical theory and practice (see Sachs, 1993; Ó Tuathail and Luke). In these cases, and many more besides, progressive practice and critical thinking require that globalization and the global scale be considered. To ignore the global scale would be to defer to the orthodox ways in which it is represented and the neoliberal policy conclusions that are drawn.

To conclude this part of the discussion, four related points can be made. First, globalization must be treated as a set of *processes*, not an inevitable end-state that implies the necessity of certain political outcomes. Secondly, these processes have both progressive and repressive potential in political terms. Thirdly, globalization, while acknowledged as a set of material processes, is also a discourse that circulates widely in political, business and academic circles. Finally, to the extent that we can analytically distinguish the processes of globalization from the political discourse that surrounds them, there is space to rethink globalization and therefore to rework the relationships it establishes. In the next section of this article we will explore some of these ways in which globalization has been rethought.

## V Counterdiscourses of globalization

The web we are left to untangle, then, is a set of material processes entwined with a discourse. It is a discourse that purportedly merely describes them, but in fact itself has material consequences. And while this discourse has been used to imply particular political practices, in themselves the processes by which social relations are stretched and intensified need not necessarily imply any particular political project. In other words, globalization is open to debate, challenge and modification. To the extent that the discourse surrounding it is a social construct, and globalization processes are humanly created, it is within our collective power to rethink and thence to rework globalization. The process of rethinking, or in her terms 'rescripting', globalization is pursued imaginatively by J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996). She suggests that workers and communities should not simply be given 'victim roles' – 'to accept this script as reality is to severely circumscribe the sorts of defensive and offensive actions that might be taken to realize economic development goals' (1996: 126). She identifies two political strategies through parallels with feminist and queer theory. One is to challenge the script from within and refuse the victim role; another is to challenge the discourse of

globalization that implies its naturalness and legitimacy. Multinational corporations (MNCs), for example, are vulnerable to workers organized into globalized networks, and may be unwittingly creative as well as destructive, for example with respect to female employment opportunities. Thus in undermining the dominant script of MNC hegemony, we can 'challenge the hegemonic representation of the superior power of the MNCs by seeing how the conditions of existence of that power are constituted in language as much as in action, and even more importantly, in a complex interaction between the two' (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 133). Globalization might then be seen as 'liberating a variety of different economic development paths' (1996: 139), thereby freeing it from its association with neoliberalism:

If we create a hegemonic globalization script with the MNC, the financial sector, the market and commodification all set up in relations of mutual reinforcement, and we then proclaim this formation as a 'reality', we invite particular outcomes. Certain cues and responses will be seen as 'normal' while others will be seen as quixotic and unrealistic. By querying globalization and by queering the body of capitalism we may open up the space for many different scripts and invite many different actors to participate in the realization of different outcomes (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 145).

Gibson-Graham's argument is clearly located within cultural politics, with an emphasis on the material power of language. Many would take issue with a political agenda that is so emphatically based on the power of language and other lines of argument have been presented which tackle the discursive and practical politics of globalization in quite different ways. They variously place emphasis on the empirical evidence for globalization; the continued role of the state in economic, political and cultural life; the assertion of place despite the interconnectedness of space; the potential for a global civil society; and the structures of global governance. Each of these strategies will be considered in turn.

## 1 Globalization: the facts?

An obvious point on which to challenge the 'reality' of globalization is through empirical evidence. One such approach employs the argumentative trope of an idealized global end-state and then lists all the ways in which the contemporary world falls short. Hirst and Thompson's (1996) *Globalization in question* has become the classic example of this mode of argument. In a variety of fields, although focusing primarily on economic indicators, they establish criteria that would qualify as a 'global' state of affairs – and the real world falls sadly short. Their purpose is to assert the continued relevance of the nation-state as the locus of political decisions. As Pieterse (1997) points out, however, what they fail to recognize is that globalization represents a process rather than a condition and therefore the dismissal of a globalized condition says nothing about globalizing tendencies (see also Dicken *et al.*, 1997).

Another argumentative strategy used by Hirst and Thompson and others is to compare the level of international linkage in contemporary data with that from previous time periods. Such data can be made to show that trade, investment and migration flows in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exceeded present levels, when taken relative to the size of economies, populations, etc., at that time (see also Weiss, 1997; Gordon, 1988; Nayyar, 1998). Such analogies have been roundly criticized. Pieterse (1997), for example, points out that early 'globalization' was shaped

by imperialism, and that contemporary globalization processes are based on very different political and technological foundations (see also Smith, 1997; Jessop, 1999). Furthermore, as Smith (1997) notes, while global markets in commodity and finance capital were already in place by the mid-twentieth century, it was only in the 1970s that production, labour and cultural capital saw equivalent globalizing tendencies. This does not, however, totally undermine the historical parallels drawn. One pertinent question that such literature does raise is whether this is an evolutionary period of change in the organization of the world economy or simply another episode of cyclical uneven development as the global geography of capitalism is re-jigged (Amin, 1996; Smith, 1997; Friedman, 1999). While trends towards economic liberalism or protectionism swing the debate in either direction, the long-term context of the present is inevitably difficult to discern.

Other analyses demonstrate the difficulties involved in trying to characterize globalization quantitatively. Allen and Thompson (1997), for example, analyse problems in empirically specifying economic globalization, which depends entirely upon whether the process is defined in terms of its scope, its depth (i.e., level of functional integration) or its pace, and upon the sectors chosen for analysis (see also Weiss, 1997). Speed-up is most often diagnosed in the financial sector and cultural/media industries, but is less dramatic in other fields. Perhaps more significantly, experiences of such acceleration are highly uneven across the world. There are, as Mittelman (1996a: 18) points out, '... holes in the global mosaic'; whole world regions and enclaves (both spatial and social) are not a part of globalization processes, meaning that 'the foremost contradiction of our time is the conflict between the zones of humanity integrated in the global division of labor and those excluded from it' (1996a: 18). Weiss (1997) similarly points out the heavily skewed distribution of world trade, production and investment among a few nations, and the concentration of these flows within regional rather than global formations (see also Dicken and Yeung, 1999), although Poon (1997) shows that such regional groupings are becoming increasingly cosmopolitanized in their trade orientation. Mittelman's broader point, however, is important – for academics and other élites with access to travel, email, the World Wide Web, etc., the idea of globalization is altogether more real than for those about whom many of us write.

There are, then, empirical reasons to treat claims of an era of globalization with caution, and there are certainly numerous opportunities to dismantle the dominant globalization discourse using hard data. But as Dicken *et al.* (1997) argue, there is a danger in such analyses that the qualitative changes that *have* taken place in the global political economy are not taken seriously. They see globalization as a set of processes that *are* qualitatively different from the internationalization of previous eras and are found in economic, political and cultural spheres. Storper (1997) too focuses on the qualitative dimensions of globalization, arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) and other flow data reveal very little about the dynamics of relations between territory/space and the economy (see also, Harvey, 1996a; Weiss, 1997). These qualitative changes refer to the functional integration of activities across the globe through centralized co-ordination and control, as opposed to simple connections forged through flows of capital, people, images, commodities, etc. This is the key difference between internationalization and globalization – while the former is a well established process of flow relations between globally dispersed sites, the latter is a quite different

tendency towards functional integration of activities in different parts of the world (Dicken, 1998).

## 2 Reasserting the state

A central component in the globalization debate has been the contemporary role of the state in a period when national political boundaries are increasingly porous to flows of capital, commodities, people and information. Some, such as Gereffi, see the nation-state as declining in importance as a locus of analysis and prefer instead to view the world economy in terms of commodity chains and product worlds (Gereffi, 1996a; 1996b). Others, such as Ohmae (1995), take the argument to greater extremes and do not stop far short of suggesting that the state has ceased to function as an effective economic entity and that the future lies with regional economies.

Such pronouncements have stimulated a growing contrary literature on the continued relevance of the state as an entity of economic regulation, political power, and cultural formation (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Hirst, 1997; Nexus, 1997). Yeung (1998b), for example, argues that even global markets are socially regulated and that nation-states form the key arena for such regulation. Thus the state continues to reinforce the role of territoriality as an important organizing principle in the global economy. The state's position remains important because of its numerous roles in the economy: guaranteeing the rights of capital; creating conditions necessary for the global expansion of domestic capital; acting as a collective capitalist in its own right; regulating the 'global' economy within and beyond its jurisdiction; and performing a key role in the internationalization of politics (Yeung, 1998b). For all these reasons, the state is seen as far from defunct. Thus, 'it is not a question of whether capital's internationalization *results* in the decline of the state, but rather how the state continues to *participate* in capital's internationalization in order to reproduce itself' (Yeung, 1998b: 293). Equally, some have argued that the recent fascination with localities in economic geography as the globalized districts, milieux and regions of economic growth seriously neglects the '... continuing purchase and relevance of nation-state institutions to shape and define the regulatory context for these "local wonders"' (Gertler, 1997b: 24).

There are, however, two caveats that need to be highlighted with respect to literature that attempts to reassert the nation-state, and more generally with a debate that can too easily descend into the dualism of global versus national (Brenner, 1997; Sassen, 1999). First, we must be clear on what we mean by the state. It is perhaps useful to distinguish the 'state' as specific national entities, from the 'State' as a generic form of governance (see Dicken *et al.*, 1997). Separating the generic concept from specific examples in this way has several effects. To begin with, it allows us to consider the varying experiences of globalization in different states (see Mann, 1997). While smaller or less influential states might have experienced a decline in power, particularly when under very open economic regimes or the disciplinary surveillance of multilateral organizations such as the IMF, other states (such as the USA) experience no diminution, and perhaps even an enhancement, of geopolitical and geoeconomic power. Diversity of experience is also found in the historical context of many postcolonial states. Much of the 'end of the state' or 'reasserting the state' literature focuses on western notions of statehood and western

experiences (Shaw, 1997). Implicit is a common experience of the emergence of the state in the nineteenth century and its zenith in the postwar Fordist regime of accumulation (although Panitch (1996) doubts that the state was ever the regulatory force with respect to capital that it is sometimes presented as having been). In many parts of the world, however, experiences of statehood have followed a quite different trajectory and are, in a postcolonial context, still being actively constructed, strengthened and extended rather than weakened (De Koninck, 1996; Glassman and Samatar, 1997).

Another analytical benefit from viewing the State as a generic concept is that it can then be disaggregated into its constituent functions. While some State functions (of some states) might be rendered more difficult to implement under globalization, others are in fact more effectively conducted (Mann, 1997; Weiss, 1997). International agreements on criminal investigation and deportation, mutual defence, customs and taxation harmonization, and statistical co-operation all mean that individual states can conduct their functions more, not less, effectively both at home and abroad. Other functions, meanwhile, might be rendered more problematic, such as macroeconomic management, immigration control or cultural policy. In addition, the State as a generic form of institutional governance need not be diminished in power even if states, understood as national sovereign entities, are undermined. Instead the State finds new transnational forms that may or may not take on the characteristics of 'traditional' states – either way, new forms of governance arise which will be discussed further below.

The second caveat that must be applied to literature reasserting the state is that it implicitly accepts the conceptual separation of the State from, in particular, capital. To argue for or against the contemporary power of the State in the face of globalizing capital implies that the two are engaged in some kind of zero-sum game in which increasing power for one represents diminished power for the other. Two points can be made about this assumption. One is that it ignores the extent to which globalization is actually actively authored by states (Panitch, 1996). The World Trade Organization, the United Nations and its constituent bodies, the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investments and other regulatory frameworks for the globalization of economic and political activity are all the projects of nation-state governments, not the imposition of some global authority. They may indeed represent a particular model of development and economic ideology, and they may also benefit some states more than others, but the fact remains they are implemented by sovereign states. The other point to make regarding the state–capital zero-sum game is that it is predicated on a universalized but ethnocentric division of spheres. In many contexts the state is itself a capitalist or is heavily involved in the market economy (see, for example, Yeung (1998a) on government-linked corporations in Singapore). Thus to talk of liberalization and deregulation rather misses the point (see Hamilton, 1989).

More sophisticated assessments of the contemporary state emphasize its continued importance but changing forms and functions. Dicken *et al.* (1997: 162, emphasis in original) usefully note that globalization is associated with a '*qualitative reorganization of the structural capacities and strategic emphases of the nation-state*' (see also Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Sassen, 1996; Evans, 1997; Hirst, 1997; Jessop, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Weiss, 1997). While the erosion or displacement of particular state functions might be a result of globalization, the State retains a crucial generic role. 'In this respect, the impact of globalization is not measured in the crude terms of whether there is "more" or "less" of the nation state, but in its changing structure and orientation' (Dicken *et al.*, 1997: 162)

– and certainly not in terms of a simplistic ‘end of the nation-state’. There is thus a rescaling of governance, but this reshapes rather than removes the nation-state from the scene – a point that, as Brenner (1997) notes, was central to Henri Lefebvre’s writings on the sociospatial organization of capitalist globalization (see also Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Roberts, 1998). It is a reconstitution of state power rather than its diminution. This power might be reworked as upward alliances with other states at the regional and international levels, or it may be ‘downwards’ with state–business alliances (what Weiss (1997) calls the ‘catalytic state’) – hence Swyngedouw’s (1997a) coinage of the term ‘glocal’ state to describe the bifurcated scales on which the state now operates.

A corollary of this rescaled concept of the state is that ‘delinking’ from the global system – the blunt assertion of national sovereignty and independence – is hardly a practical political strategy (Mittelman, 1996a; Pieterse, 1997). Instead some writers (reviewed by Panitch, 1996) advocate a strategy of ‘progressive competitiveness’ which accepts globalization but without its neoliberal overtones. Such an approach would give ‘strategic priority’ to the state in sustaining a substantial social wage, and promoting education, welfare and innovation. This approach perhaps best approximates the strategy of centre-left parties in Europe and North America. It does not, of course, address the fundamental contradictions of a capitalist system and, as Panitch points out, assumes that world market growth is rapid enough to accommodate all who adopt this strategy. But this approach does make a convincing case that governments can still act for the benefit of their citizens and dispels New Right myths that globalization must be equated with neoliberal policies and labour/regulatory ‘flexibility’ (Nexus, 1997). The state is effectively written into the script as a humane handmaiden to competition.

### 3 Embedding the global: asserting places

While the literature reasserting the state focuses attention on a specific spatial unit and its continued regulatory importance, there is also a broader line of thinking that emphasizes the importance of place, locality and territoriality more generally (Dirlik, 1999). This work is particularly aimed at representations of the global scale that present a network of flows without affinity or affiliation to specific places. Kevin Cox (1997d), for example, argues that globalization does not just mean deterritorialization and enhanced locational substitutability, but also encompasses territorializing tendencies: ‘those conditions, those social relations that result in enduring commitments to particular places, which can in turn be sources of competitive advantage and so serve to reinforce those commitments’ (1997d: 5). The implication is that capital is not as mobile, nor is labour as immobile, as many accounts suggest.

At a simple level this might refer to the fixity of capital assets in a particular location – ‘sunk costs’ (Clark and Wrigley, 1995). But it also refers to the social embeddedness of capital, related to regulatory regimes, labour markets, consumer markets, industrial networks, etc. (Dicken, 1994; Dicken *et al.*, 1997). Gertler (1997a), for example, demonstrates the embeddedness of technology and the importance of place and national boundaries in the use of advanced machinery technology. He shows how the use of machinery is embedded in local social relations of production in the workplace and also

shaped by national regulatory frameworks. Yeung (1998b) too argues that transnational capital is embedded both in home country contexts and in host countries. Ownership and corporate governance also remain national rather than global, and technological development in particular is deeply embedded in particular milieux of home countries. These aspects of local embeddedness mean that industrial capital is not as mobile as is frequently assumed by global commentators who tend to extrapolate from the financial sector. But even financial sector flows are rather more rooted than some would imply (see Corbridge *et al.*, 1994, and particularly Martin, 1994).

Several points need to be clarified with respect to these arguments. First, as with the state literature, it is important that the debate does not descend into an argument of globality vs. locality. The two cannot be seen as opposing categories – to tug argumentatively in either direction is to neglect their essentially dialectical and relational nature (Swyngedouw, 1997a). This is a relationship that Storper (1997) recognizes in his distinction between the ‘territorial’ and the ‘flow’ economies. Secondly, we should be wary of rejecting the global scale and globalizing tendencies as meaningless rhetoric just because there are signs of embeddedness in place. Such embeddedness is now well established in the literature, but it does not imply there aren’t *globalizing tendencies* at work within and between the agents facilitating capital, commodity and other flows (Dicken *et al.*, 1997). The sensitivity that is required here to the multiple scales of social processes is perhaps better developed in the literature on cultural globalization than in the economic literature. Through concepts such as hybridization, cosmopolitanization, syncretism, inbetweenness and disjuncture, geographers and cultural theorists have developed a vocabulary to understand the importance and particularities of place and locale while at the same time acknowledging the ways in which ‘global’ processes transgress such boundaries (Pred and Watts, 1992; Bhabha, 1994; Featherstone, 1995; Pieterse, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Mitchell, 1997). Thirdly, Pieterse (1997) suggests that the ‘post-Fordist’ literature on industrial districts and localities has tended to explore how localities and regions respond to changes in capitalism, but the sustainability of these local or regional fixes has not been adequately addressed: ‘a limitation to many of these proposals is that they tend to *abstain* from considering what is happening *beyond* the preferred frameworks [or scales] of settlement, be they local or national; the global sphere is bracketed and somehow fades into the background’ (Pieterse, 1997: 379).

The assertion of place is also a complex issue for those grappling with the social consequences of globalization. The labour movement in particular faces a tension between what Harvey (1995; 1996b) describes as ‘militant particularisms’ and universalized socialist goals to revolutionize capitalism. Radical analyses of global capitalism need the global scale as an arena for contestation, but the transcendence of place- and issue-specific disputes to achieve broader goals often raises contradictions between overthrowing capitalism and attempting to live more comfortably within it.

#### 4 Global civil society: other globalisms

Each of the reactions to globalization discussed so far has tended towards undermining the discourse of globalization, but there is also a case for harnessing and encouraging globalization processes. Work focusing on civil society movements is among the most sanguine about the potential benefits of globalization and the possibilities for

alternative interpretations of the process (Falk, 1995; Roberts, 1998). Mittelman (1996b; 1999) suggests that civil society is being globalized in a way that means 'new social movements . . . are themselves global phenomena, a worldwide response to the deleterious effects of economic globalization' (Mittelman, 1996a: 10). These movements include environmental, labour, human rights, development, peace, women's and indigenous people's groups (Marden, 1997). Eccleston (1996; and Eccleston and Potter, 1996), for example, examines the international linkages of environmental NGOs in Malaysia and Indonesia, while Herod (1997c; 1998; see also Cox, 1997c) has explored the internationalization of labour unions.

For some, these movements embody a new vision of democracy. Held (1995), for example, argues that democracy must become a transnational affair (see also McGrew, 1997). This is, however, a shift that requires considerable rethinking of traditional notions of politics. As Low (1997) points out, politics has generally been conceived as bounded in spatial terms. But democratization at a global scale rests as much on networked forms, unconstrained by areal containers. Thus, argues Low, under conditions of globalization we mustn't be constrained by areally bounded notions of democracy as a place-based process.

A further caveat with respect to globalizing social movements is highlighted by Eccleston (1996). He focuses attention on the political realities of global linkages among civil society movements. While international linkages assist with fund raising and raise the profile and prestige of the southeast Asian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) he describes, they also raise suspicion from governmental authorities and thus lessen opportunities to influence policy. Another danger of crossborder linkages is in the cultural and political differences that exist between groups addressing similar issues – globalized visions of environmentalism or human rights, for example, risk obliterating identities at other scales. As David Craig (1997: 271–72) notes with reference to urban NGOs in Manila, development can become the replication of 'extra-local and even global conceptions of what donors have recognised and identified with as being normal'. Law (1997) makes a similar point with reference to the work of foreign and Filipino health NGOs working in Cebu City. For these reasons, some would prefer to focus less on the formation of an international civil society for transnational democracy, and more on a series of movements that are exemplary for one another, while national specificities will continue to prevail. It is, after all, at the level of national polities that most of the political decisions such movements contest are still taken (Panitch, 1996).

## 5 Global governance

While not necessarily subscribing to the 'decline of the state' thesis, many writers have turned their attention to the new forms of governance that now regulate the world economy. Regulation in this sense refers as much to the frameworks and ground rules for operation as direct government *per se*. The contemporary State, as noted above, may not be the western model of Fordist economic management, but new governance structures at the national, regional and global scales do regulate economic and political activity in multiple ways (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Held, 1995; Roberts, 1998). Thus, notwithstanding the arguments mentioned earlier concerning the ways in which capital and other flows are embedded and territorialized, it is also true that the 'flow



economy', as Storper calls it, is regulated. As Sassen (1999) points out, the global economy needs to be implemented, reproduced, serviced and financed, and these functions are carried out by institutions and infrastructures, not simply 'markets'. Such co-ordination and control structures might include financial, legal and accountancy norms (Sassen, 1996), multilateral frameworks for trade, cultural and educational exchange, and international institutions for political, economic and cultural co-operation (see, for example, McMichael and Myhre, 1991; McMichael, 1992, on global food regimes; Leyshon, 1992; Roberts, 1998, on financial regulation). In some cases these structures are intergovernmental, but many are what Sassen (1999) calls 'privatized intermediary institutional arrangements' involving, for example, large merchant banks, credit-ratings agencies, management consultancies and so on.

These structures and arrangements have been erased from view, according to Panitch (1996), because they consistently work under an ideological consensus to 'institutionalize neoliberalism'. But for many, there lies great potential for these global structures to embody a more progressive social agenda. Three approaches to the issue of global governance might be identified.

The first involves identifying key points in the chains and networks of economic activity that might allow their transformation. Thus Whatmore and Thorne (1997), for example, trace the commodity chain involved in coffee production and show how 'fair trade' production networks recast the globalized production and marketing of coffee to produce more just social outcomes. The second approach to global governance involves regulation of the global economy in order to arrest the erosion or restructuring of state power. Thus, in theory at least, power over economic processes will remain at the scale of democratic national polities and allow states to negotiate their relationships with global capital. Panitch (1996: 111–12) advocates this sort of arrangement:

International agreements and treaties between states will most certainly be required, but they will have the opposite purpose to the constitutionalizing of neoliberalism. They will be explicitly designed to permit states to effect democratic control over capital within their domain and to facilitate the realization of alternative economic strategies.

With the shock of financial crisis spreading across east and southeast Asia in 1997 and 1998, such mild economic nationalism has found considerable support among ruling élites. Perhaps most notoriously, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia suggested to a World Bank seminar in September 1997 that currency trading is 'unnecessary, unproductive and immoral'.

The third approach to global governance embodies a more whole-hearted embrace of the possibilities for reforming regulatory structures to foster a socially just global order. Pieterse (1997: 379), for example, argues that 'the futures of capitalism are global, not because all and everything is going global but because any local or regional settlement is exposed to global dynamics' and thus '... global problems ultimately require global remedies'. Such remedies might include regulations and controls on financial flows such as the so-called Tobin tax (see Felix, 1996), universalized labour rights and the provision of basic needs. But international framework co-operation is also important in the noneconomic aspects of globalization – pollution and environmental degradation, migration, drug trafficking, crime, health and so on. In all these areas there exists the potential for globally negotiated rules, standards and frameworks (Edwards, 1997).

## VI Conclusion: the relationality of scale

The cursory mapping of literature on globalization presented here suggests some important directions for the ways we can imagine and shape different global futures. Several key conclusions can be drawn. To begin with, globalization can usefully be read as a production of scale in which the global is represented as the fundamental level at which social process, economic policies and political futures must be understood. This representation has frequently been associated with neoliberal strategies of government and thus all too often dismissed as political rhetoric used to justify the dismantling of welfare states and the imposition of harsh labour regimes. Indeed a pervading tension within the critical literature on globalization is between the felt need to highlight the damaging effects of globalization – on culture, environment and economic well-being – but at the same time expose the idea as a fraud, a myth, an ideological construct used for political purposes. But globalization discourse is not simply rhetoric, it is also rooted in material processes of qualitative change in the global system whereby social relations across space are being integrated in more intensive and extensive ways. For some, this represents an institutional or governance ‘fix’ for the crisis tendencies of post-Fordist capitalism. But one need not read these changes as the unerring logics of capitalism in order to recognize shifts in the organization of economic, cultural and political life – shifts that include dynamics at the global scale. However, once these shifts are acknowledged as occurring and separated from a sense of inevitability or necessity, then the neoliberal corollaries of such processes can be undermined and other global futures imagined. This does not mean that globalization has not indeed been used discursively for political ends. But it does mean that its discursive construction is open to alternatives.

Rethinking global futures is, however, fraught with pitfalls. First, in choosing to challenge discourses of globalization by assessing their empirical validity, writers on globalization have too often reduced the process either to an ‘end-state’ that doesn’t exist, or to a cyclical historical episode that we have seen before. These convenient argumentative tropes allow the easy dismissal of globalization as hollow rhetoric, but what they often fail to acknowledge is that globalization represents material processes and tendencies that need not reach some notional globalized state in order to be important. Furthermore, these processes are qualitatively different from the internationalizing tendencies of other periods.

A second instinct in tackling globalization discourse is the reassertion of territoriality – usually the state or, more generically, ‘place’. But this too presents complications. There is a tendency to treat the reassertion of place as a zero-sum game – that is, the continued importance of state, region, locality, etc., is taken to be a refutation of globalization. This can lead to rather pointless debates about, for example, the ‘end of’ or ‘reassertion of’ the state. Two refinements provide the most promising ways forward out of this impasse. First, we should focus less attention on tracing the decline or continuance of existing state functions, and instead consider new forms the state adopts and new institutions of governance in a globalizing world. In this way, attention is drawn to both the ways in which states manage their place in a global context and ways in which interstate frameworks facilitate and regulate global flows. By recognizing these new forms of governance, they too can become sites where political, economic and cultural issues are contested. ‘Actually existing

globalization' is, after all, 'done' by people and institutions; it is *not*, as Ó Tuathail (1998: 87) eloquently notes:

the globalization of neoliberal visions, the Utopia of friction-free global markets or Internet-driven virtual worlds, but the contingent and unsteady symbiosis of imperfectly transnational networks, institutions and firms, and the 'ramshackle diversity' of international bureaucracies, states, police, mafias and other sources of power struggling for shifting territorial authority in the post-cold war world.

A further means beyond the 'global-local' formulation of the debate is to recognize that different scales of social life cannot be viewed as hierarchical, distinct and mutually exclusive, but rather as simultaneous and nested loci where social processes are played out. Too often we read about global processes and local processes as if the two followed entirely separate logics. Discussions of global-local tensions and relations which reinforce this sense of separation are still commonplace. This is understandable enough. As Watson *et al.* (1997: 276) point out: 'the idea of a global-local dialectic or relationship has special utility in the late twentieth century because developments in many spheres of human activity, such as social, economic and political relations and processes within cities, are so clearly affected by global and local influences'. But what is a global influence that isn't in some way 'localized', and how many 'local influences' are really bounded in such a neat way? To go beyond this, it is useful to think of scales as *relational*. Swyngedouw (1997a) makes a particularly strong case for a relational view of scale. Scales are, he argues (1997a: 140), 'simultaneous' rather than hierarchical and thus without theoretical or empirical priority in the analysis of social life:

The crux is not, therefore, whether the local or the global has theoretical and empirical priority in shaping the conditions of daily life, but rather how the local, global, and the other relevant (although perpetually shifting) geographical scale levels are the result, the product of processes, of sociospatial change.

The key is thus to understand economic, cultural and political processes, rather than taking any particular scale as the starting point for analysis. Globalization is not, as Dicken *et al.* (1997: 60) point out, 'just about one scale becoming more important than the rest, it is also about changes in the very nature of the relationships between scales' (see also Amin, 1997; Brenner, 1997; Jessop, 1999). Much of this argument was, in fact, presaged by Lefebvre in his writing on the production of space and scale, as Brenner points out:

We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces . . . No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldwide does not abolish the local (Lefebvre, cited by Brenner, 1997: 144).

The only sense in which a 'global-local dialectic' is a useful idea is in collapsing that dualism and recognizing the constructedness of scale. Hence Swyngedouw (1997a: 160) argues that 'strategizing around the politics of scale necessitates negotiating through difference and similarity to formulate collective strategies without sacrificing local loyalties and militant particularisms'. Once particular scales are no longer privileged in social analysis then processes can be traced across them rather than being contained within them. And once the boosterist discourse of globalization is divorced from the qualitative changes that are occurring in our social world, then it becomes possible to consider how new frameworks of governance should be constructed. The task is therefore not to unthink globalization, but to change it.

## Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the financial assistance provided by NUS Academic Research Grant no. RP970013, for the collegial support and collaboration of Peter Dicken, Lily Kong, Kris Olds, Elen Sia and Henry Yeung, and for the helpful comments of three anonymous reviewers.

## References

- Agnew, J.** and **Corbridge, S.** 1995: *Mastering space: hegemony, territory and international political economy*. London: Routledge.
- Allen, J.** and **Thompson, G.** 1997: Think global, then think again – economic globalization in context. *Area* 29, 213–27.
- Amin, A.** 1997: Placing globalization. *Theory, Culture and Society* 14, 123–37.
- Amin, S.** 1996: The challenge of globalization. *Review of International Political Economy* 3, 216–59.
- Appadurai, A.** 1996: *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Barnes, T.** 1995: Political economy I: 'the culture, stupid'. *Progress in Human Geography* 19, 423–31.
- Beauregard, R.** 1995: Theorizing the global–local connection. In Knox, P. and Taylor, P., editors, *World cities in a world system*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bhabha, H.** 1994: *The location of culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Brenner, N.** 1997: Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's *Geographies of globalization*. *Public Culture* 10, 135–67.
- Castells, M.** 1996: *The rise of the network society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Clark, G.** and **O'Connor, K.** 1997: The informational content of financial products and the spatial structure of the global finance industry. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- Clark, G.L.** and **Wrigley, N.** 1995: Sunk costs: a framework for economic geography. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers* 20, 204–23.
- Corbridge, S., Thrift, N.** and **Martin, R.**, editors, 1994: *Money, power and space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cox, K.** 1992: The politics of globalization: a sceptic's view. *Political Geography* 11, 427–9.
- 1997a: Spaces of dependence, spaces of engagement and the politics of scale, or: looking for local politics. *Political Geography* 17, 1–23.
- 1997b: Representation and power in the politics of scale. *Political Geography* 17, 41–44.
- 1997c: Globalization and geographies of workers' struggle in the late twentieth century. In Lee, R. and Wills, J., editors, *Geographies of economies*, London: Arnold.
- 1997d: Introduction: globalization and its politics in question. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- Cox, R.** 1996: A perspective on globalization. In Mittelman, J., editor, *Globalization: critical reflections*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Craig, D.** 1997: Smokey Mountain: local and global marginality in a Manila shanty town. In Rimmer, P., editor, *Pacific rim development: integration and globalisation in the Asia-Pacific economy*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- De Koninck, R.** 1996: The peasantry as the territorial spearhead of the state in south-east Asia: the case of Vietnam. *Sojourn* 11, 231–58.
- Delaney, D.** and **Leitner, H.** 1997: The political construction of scale. *Political Geography* 16, 93–97.
- Dicken, P.** 1994: Global–local tensions: firms and states in the global space-economy. *Economic Geography* 70, 101–28.
- 1998: *Global shift: transforming the world economy*. London: Paul Chapman.
- Dicken, P., Peck, J.** and **Tickell, A.** 1997: Unpacking the global. In Lee, R. and Wills, J., editors, *Geographies of economies*, London: Arnold.
- Dicken, P.** and **Yeung, H.** 1999: Investing in the future: east and southeast Asian firms in the global economy. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Dirlik, A.** 1999: Globalism and the politics of place. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L.

- and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Eccleston, B.** 1996: Does north–south collaboration enhance NGO influence on deforestation policies in Malaysia and Indonesia? *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 34, 66–89.
- Eccleston, B.** and **Potter, D.** 1996: Environmental NGOs and different political contexts in southeast Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In Parnwell, M. and Bryant, R., editors, *Environmental change in southeast Asia*, London: Routledge.
- Edwards, M.** 1997: Globalisation, multilateralism and developing countries. Paper posted on Nexus website: <http://www.netnexus.org/EDWARDS.html>
- Evans, P.** 1997: The eclipse of the state? Reflections on stateness in an era of globalization. *World Politics* 50, 62–87.
- Falk, R.** 1995: *On humane governance: toward a new global politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Featherstone, M.** 1995. *Undoing culture: globalization, postmodernism and identity*. London: Sage.
- Felix, D.** 1996: Financial globalization versus free trade: the case for the Tobin tax. *UNCTAD Review* 8, 63–103.
- Friedman, J.** 1999: Class formation, hybridity and ethnification in declining global hegemonies. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Gereffi, G.** 1996a: The elusive last lap in the quest for developed-country status. In Mittelman, J., editor, *Globalization: critical reflections*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- 1996b: Commodity chains and regional divisions of labour in east Asia. *Journal of Asian Business* 12, 75–112.
- Gertler, M.** 1997a: Between the global and the local: the spatial limits to productive capital. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- 1997b: Globality and locality: the future of ‘geography’ and the nation-state. In Rimmer, P., editor, *Pacific rim development: integration and globalisation in the Asia-Pacific economy*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Gibson-Graham, J.K.** 1996: *The end of capitalism (as we knew it): a feminist critique of political economy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Glassman, J.** and **Samatar, A.** 1997: Development geography and the third-world state. *Progress in Human Geography* 21, 164–98.
- Gordon, D.** 1988: The global economy: new edifice or crumbling foundations? *New Left Review* 168, 24–64.
- Gregory, D.** 1994: *Geographical imaginations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hamilton, C.** 1989: The irrelevance of economic liberalization in the third world. *World Development* 17, 1523–30.
- Hanson, S.** and **Pratt, G.** 1995: *Gender, work and space*. New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, D.** 1995: Militant particularism and global ambition: the conceptual politics of place, space and environment in the work of Raymond Williams. *Social Text* 42, 69–98.
- 1996a: Globalization in question. Unpublished MS, Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.
- 1996b: *Justice, nature and the geography of difference*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Held, D.** 1995: *Democracy and the global order*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Herod, A.** 1997a: Labor’s spatial praxis and the geography of contract bargaining in the US east coast longshore industry. *Political Geography* 16, 145–69.
- 1997b: From a geography of labor to a labor geography: labor’s spatial fix and the geography of capitalism. *Antipode* 29, 1–31.
- 1997c: Notes on a spatialized labour politics: scale and the political geography of dual unionism in the US longshore industry. In Lee, R. and Wills, J., editors, *Geographies of economies*, London: Arnold.
- 1998: Of blocs, flows and networks: the end of the cold war, cyberspace, and the geoeconomics of organized labor at the fin de millenaire. In Herod, A., Ó’Tuathail, G., and Roberts, S., editors, *An unruly world? Globalization, governance and geography*, London: Routledge.
- Hirst, P.** 1997: The global economy – myths and realities. *International Affairs* 73, 409–25.
- Hirst, P.** and **Thompson, G.** 1996: *Globalization in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jessop, R.** 1997: Capitalism and its future: remarks on regulation, government and governance. *Review of International Political Economy* 4, 561–81.
- 1999: Some critical reflections on globalization and its illogic(s). In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.

- Jonas, A.** 1994: Editorial: the scale politics of spatiality. *Society and Space* 12, 257–64.
- Jones, K.** 1997: Scale as epistemology. *Political Geography* 17, 25–28.
- Kelly, P.F.** 1997: Globalization, power and the politics of scale in the Philippines. *Geoforum* 28, 151–71.
- Law, L.** 1997: Cebu and Ceboom: the political place of globalization in a Philippine city. In Rimmer, P.J., editor, *Pacific rim development: integration and globalization in the Asia-Pacific economy*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Lefebvre, H.** 1991: *The production of space* (trans. D. Nicholson-Smith). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Levitt, T.** 1983: The globalization of markets. *Harvard Business Review* May–June, 92–102.
- Leysdon, A.** 1992: The transformation of regulatory order: regulating the global economy and environment. *Geoforum* 23, 249–67.
- 1997: Introduction: true stories? global nightmares, global dreams and writing globalization. In Lee, R. and Wills, J., editors, *Geographies of economies*, London: Arnold.
- Low, M.** 1997: Representation unbound: globalization and democracy. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- Mann, M.** 1997: Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? *Review of International Political Economy* 4, 472–512.
- Marden, P.** 1997: Geographies of dissent: globalization, identity and the nation. *Political Geography* 16, 37–64.
- Martin, R.** 1994: Stateless monies, global financial integration and national economic autonomy: the end of geography? In Corbridge, S., Thrift, N. and Martin, R., editors, *Money, power and space*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGrew, A.**, editor, 1997: *The transformation of democracy?* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- McMichael, P.** 1992: Tensions between national and international control of the world food order: contours of a new food regime. *Sociological Perspectives* 35, 343–65.
- McMichael, P.** and **Myhre, D.** 1991: Global regulation vs. the nation-state: agro-food systems and the new politics of capital. *Capital and Class* 43, 83–105.
- Mitchell, K.** 1997: Transnational discourse: bringing geography back in. *Antipode* 29, 101–14.
- Mittelman, J.** 1996a: The dynamics of globalization. In Mittelman, J., editor, *Globalization: critical reflections*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- 1996b: How does globalization really work? In Mittelman, J., editor, *Globalization: critical reflections*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- 1999: Resisting globalization: environmental politics in eastern Asia. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Naisbitt, J.** 1994: *Global paradox: the bigger the world economy the more powerful its smallest players*. New York: W. Morrow.
- Nayyar, D.** 1998: *Globalisation: the past in our present*. Third World Network Trade and Development Series 6. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network.
- Nexus (Globalisation Theme Group)** 1997: The politics of globaliation. Paper posted on Nexus website: <http://www.netnexus.org/GLOBETHEMEGROUP.html>
- Notermans, T.** 1997: Social democracy and external constraints. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- O'Brien, R.** 1992: *Global financial integration: the end of geography*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Ohmae, K.** 1990: *The borderless world*. New York: Harper Business.
- 1995: *The end of the nation state: the rise of regional economies*. London: HarperCollins.
- Ó Tuathail, G.** 1998: Political geography III: dealing with deterritorialization. *Progress in Human Geography* 22, 81–93.
- Ó Tuathail, G.** and **Luke, T.** 1994: Present at the (dis)integration: deterritorialization and reterritorialization in the new wor(l)d order. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84, 399–417.
- Panitch, L.** 1996: Rethinking the role of the state. In Mittelman, J., editor, *Globalization: critical reflections*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Peck, J.** 1996: *Workplace: the social regulation of labour markets*. New York: Guilford.
- Philippine Daily Inquirer** 1996: Ramos thanks senators for summit support, 3 December, 2.
- Pieterse, J.** 1995: Globalization as hybridization. In Featherstone, M., Lash, S. and Robertson, R. editors, *Global Modernities*, London: Sage.
- 1997: Going global: futures of capitalism. *Development and Change* 28, 367–82.
- Piven, F.** 1995: Is it global economics or neo-laissez-faire? *New Left Review* 213, 107–14.
- Poon, J.** 1997: The cosmopolitanization of trade

- regions: global trends and implications, 1965–1990. *Economic Geography* 73, 390–404.
- Pred, A. and Watts, M.** 1992. *Reworking modernity: capitalisms and symbolic discontent*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Ramos, F.** 1996a: 'Letter to the nation.' Speech on a Philippine government Internet site: <http://www.philippines.gov.ph:80/mhp/textversion/ulatjul96.html2>
- Roberts, S.** 1998: Geo-governance in trade and finance and political geographies of dissent. In Herod, A., Ó'Tuathail, G. and Roberts, S., editors, *An unruly world? Globalization, governance and geography*, London: Routledge.
- Sachs, W.** 1993: *Global ecology*. London: Zed Books.
- Sassen, S.** 1996: *Losing control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 1999: Servicing the global economy: reconfigured states and private agents. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Saul, J.R.** 1995. *The unconscious civilization*. Concord, Ontario: Anansi Press.
- Shaw, M.** 1997: The state of globalization: towards a theory of state transformation. *Review of International Political Economy* 4, 497–513.
- Smith, N.** 1992: Contours of a spatialized politics: homeless vehicles and the production of geographical scale. *Social Text* 33, 54–81.
- 1993: Homeless/global: scaling places. In Bird, J., Curtis, B., Putnam, T., Robertson, G. and Tickner, L., editors, *Mapping the futures: local cultures, global change*, London: Routledge.
- 1996: Spaces of vulnerability: the space of flows and the politics of scale. *Critique of Anthropology* 16, 63–77.
- 1997: The satanic geographies of globalization: uneven development in the 1990s. *Public Culture* 10, 169–89.
- Smith, N. and Katz, C.** 1993: Grounding metaphor: towards a spatialized politics. In Keith, M. and Pile, S., editors, *Place and the politics of identity*, London: Routledge.
- Spich, R.** 1995: Globalization folklore: problems of myth and ideology in the discourse on globalization. *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 8, 6–29.
- Steingard, D. and Fitzgibbons, D.** 1995: Challenging the juggernaut of globalization: a manifesto for academic praxis. *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 8, 30–54.
- Storper, M.** 1997: Territories, flows, and hierarchies in the global economy. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- Swyngedouw, E.** 1996: Reconstructing citizenship, the rescaling of the state and the new authoritarianism: closing the Belgian mines. *Urban Studies* 33, 1499–521.
- 1997a: Neither global nor local: 'glocalization' and the politics of scale. In Cox, K., editor, *Spaces of globalization: reasserting the power of the local*, London: Guilford.
- 1997b: Excluding the other: the production of scale and scaled politics. In Lee, R. and Wills, J., editors, *Geographies of economies*, London: Arnold.
- Thrift, N.** 1998: The rise of soft capitalism. In Herod, A., Ó'Tuathail, G. and Roberts, S., editors, *An unruly world? Globalization, governance and geography*, London: Routledge.
- 1999: The globalisation of business knowledge. In Olds, K., Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Kong, L. and Yeung, H., editors, *Globalisation and Asia-Pacific: contested territories*, London: Routledge.
- Thrift, N. and Olds, K.** 1996: Refiguring the economic in economic geography. *Progress in Human Geography* 20, 311–37.
- Tickell, A.** 1998: Questions about globalization. *Geoforum* 29, 1–5.
- Walck, C. and Bilimoria, D.** 1995: Editorial: challenging 'globalization' discourses. *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 8, 3–5.
- Waters, M.** 1995: *Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Watson, S., Le Heron, R. and Rimmer, P.** 1997: Conclusion: global-local relations revisited. In Rimmer, P., editor, *Pacific rim development: integration and globalisation in the Asia-Pacific economy*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Weiss, L.** 1997: Globalization and the myth of the powerless state. *New Left Review* 225, 3–27.
- Whatmore, S. and Thorne, L.** 1997: Nourishing networks: alternative geographies of food. In Watts, M. and Goodman, D., editors, *Postindustrial nature: culture, economy and the consumption of food*, London: Routledge.
- Yeung, H.** 1998a: The political economy of transnational corporations: a study of the regionalization of Singaporean firms. *Political Geography* 17, 389–416.
- 1998b: Capital, state and space: contesting the borderless world. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers* 23, 291–309.